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Although cooperatives have long been a fixture of the world
economy, the 2008 financial crisis sparked renewed interest in
cooperatives as a democratic and sustainable alternative to conventional
business forms, and the United Nations named 2012 the "International
This renewed enthusiasm for
Year of [the] Cooperatives." 1
cooperatives has taken many forms, including the "Bank Transfer Day",
also known as "Move Your Money" day, which led to an influx of new
members at credits unions. 2 For its part, Germany has not only been the
1. See generally Julian B. Heron, Jr. & David B. Friedman, Retrospective: New
Challenges for California Agriculture in World Export Markets, 1 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L.
REV. 1, 30 (1991) reprinted in 20 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 239, 268 (2011) (suggesting
transnational agricultural cooperatives as a method of securing access to markets for
Californian agricultural goods); U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS DIV. FOR Soc. PoL'Y
&
DEV.,
INTERNATIONAL
YEAR
OF
COOPERATIVES
2012,
available
at
http://social.un.org/coopsyear/uncoops.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
2. David Dayen, Move Your Money: Hundreds of Thousands of Transfers from Big
Banks to Small in the Last Three Months, FIREDOGLAKE (Feb. 3, 2012, 7:35 AM), available
at
http:!/news.firedoglake.com/2012/02/03/move-your-money-hundreds-of-thousands-oftransfers-from-big-banks-to-small-in-last-three-months/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). The
effort led to over 5 million new members at credit unions and small banks. Id.
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site of an economic boom in recent years 3 but has also witnessed an
exponential increase in the number of cooperatives being organized. 4
The proliferation of renewable energy cooperatives has received the
most sustained media attention, but agricultural, housing and even beerbrewing cooperatives have been a part of this upsurge. 5
While the upswing in cooperative development in Germany is
notable in its own right, of even greater significance is the application of
a new organizational model to cooperative projects, which both
facilitates the growth of democratic enterprises and organizes them in
cohesive networks. 6 Pioneered by the Mietshauser Syndikat in over
eighty established projects across Germany, the use of limited liability
companies held jointly by the local residents and a larger network has
proven both effective as an engine of growth and compatible with the
democratic and constitutive ideals so closely identified with
cooperatives. 7 Notably, the organization is entirely democratic yet has
discarded the standard cooperative model as too inflexible and
overburdened by regulation to operate in an economy of scale. 8
This note argues that the Mietshauser Syndikat model can be repurposed from the development of housing cooperatives to the
development of networks of democratic enterprises in both civil and
common law jurisdictions. Furthermore, it argues that the Mietshauser
Syndikat model offers considerable advantages over conventional
cooperatives because of its relative flexibility and ability to guarantee
democratic management. As such, the Mietshauser Syndikat is better
3. See Regierung sieht deutsche Wirtschafi vor starkem Aufschwung, DIE ZEIT (Oct. 23,
2013 I :06 PM), available at http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2013-10/wachstumsprognosedeutsche-wirtschaft (last visited Nov 16, 2014).
4. See Christiane Grefe, Und jetzt a/le - Gemeinsam Strom erzeugen, Hauser bauen,
Banken besitzen: Genossenschafien haben wieder Zulauf, DIE ZEIT (Apr. 23, 2012, 7:51
PM), available at http://www.zeit.de/2012/ 17 /Genossenschaften (last visited Nov. 16, 2014)
(detailing the uptick in the number of cooperatives founded since the tum of the century).
5. See generally id.; see also Nina Anika-Klotz, No Offence, liebe Biertrinker!, DIE
ZEIT (July 25, 2013, I :47 PM), available at http://www.zeit.de/lebensart/essentrinken/2013-07/craft-beer-vagabund-brauerei (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); Nadine
Oberhuber, Mein Strom, dein Strom, DIE ZEIT at 28 (October 23, 2014), available at
http://www.zeit.de/2014/44/emeuerbare-energien-strom-energiewende
(describing
the
advantages of investing in green energy cooperatives, described by experts as particularly
stable entities with a bankruptcy rate ofO. l %).
6. See Anika Kreller, Vom Hausbesetzer zum Hausbesitzer, DIE ZEIT (June 25, 2012,
3:39 PM), available at www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2012-06/immobilien-berlin (last visited Nov.
15,2014).
7. See
Standortkarte,
MIETSHAUSER
SYNDIKAT,
available
at
http://www.syndikat.org/de/standortkarte/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
8. See
Die
Verbundbausteine,
MIETSHAUSER
SYNDIKAT,
available
at
http://www.syndikat.org/de/syndikat/verbundbausteine/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
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suited to stimulating sustainable, democratic and equitable economic
development than any other existing large-scale cooperative models.
Thus, while other prominent cooperative enterprises sacrificed aspects
of their democratic character in the name of economic necessity, the
Mietshauser Syndikat has successfully persevered in maintaining direct,
large-scale, consensus-based democracy. This model will make it
possible to establish networks of democratic enterprises that are
sustainable, geared for growth and operable in both common law and
civil law jurisdictions.
To evaluate and test the applicability of the Mietshauser Syndikat's
model to other national contexts this note will consider two examples of
cooperative development: the famed Mondragon Cooperative network
based in Spain and the Evergreen Cooperatives in Cleveland, Ohio. 9
For contextual purposes, Parts I through III will examine the legal and
regulatory practices in Germany, Spain and the United States with
regard to limited liability companies ("LLCs"), cooperatives and nonprofit entities. While the background on these three countries' law and
regulation will inform the reader's understanding of each enterprise's
development and operations, Spain and the U.S. will also serve as
theoretical stand-ins for other civil and common law countries,
illustrating the reproducibility of the Mietshauser Syndikat model in
other jurisdictions. Part IV will then focus on the two established
cooperative enterprises of scale, Mondragon and Evergreen, noting their
prominent features and characteristics. Finally, Part V will examine the
Mietshauser Syndikat, compare it with the enterprises discussed in Part
IV and consider the applicability, merits and advantages of the
Mietshauser Syndikat's model in the development of democratic
enterprises.

I. GERMAN LAW, REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES

In Germany business entities are generally termed "stock
corporations." 10 Within this category there exist several corporate

9. See generally MONDRAGON CORPORATION, available at http://www.mondragoncorporation.com/ENG.aspx?language=en-US (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); EVERGREEN
COOPERATIVES, available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2014);
Field Study No. 2: The Evergreen Cooperatives, CAPITAL INST. , available at
http://www.capitalinstitute.org/sites/capitalinstitute.org/files/docs/FS2Evergreen%20full%20article.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Evergreen Field
Study] (independent study and evaluation of the Evergreen Cooperative); MIETSHAUSER
SYNDIKAT, available at www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
10. Susan-Jacqueline Butler, Models of Modern Corporations: A Comparative Analysis

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/6

4

Carroll: Economic Democracy, Made in Germany: The Mietshauser Syndikat Mod

2014]

Economic Democracy, Made in Germany

197

forms, the most common of which is the Limited Liability Company
("GmbH"). 11 The GmbH is the single most important entity utilized by
the Mietshauser Syndikat and serves, in democratized form, as a
replacement for the cooperative. 12 Cooperatives are governed by
substantially different laws and regulations, although the names and
duties of officers are often identical to a GmbH's. 13 The principal nonprofit entity in Germany is the Verein (Association), which serves a
range of charitable and service functions. 14

A. The GmbH: The German LLC
GmbHs are the single most common business entity in Germany. 15
The process of founding a GmbH requires €25,000 in starting capital, 16
half of which must be on hand at the time of registration, 17 an operating
agreement for the GmbH, and identification of the company's officers. 18
GmbHs with fewer than 500 employees are permitted to operate under a
single manager, whereas larger GmbHs must employ the dual
governance structure where a board of directors oversees management
on behalf of the shareholders. 19 As such, GmbHs are especially suitable
for smaller or closely-held enterprises. 20 However, there are also a
number of so-called "GmbH giants," often local affiliates or

of German and US. Corporate Structures, 17 ARIZ. J. INTL'L & COMP. LAW 555, 555 (2000)
(German: "Aktiengesellschaften").
11. See id. at 556 n. l (German: Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung).
12. See Die Verbundbausteine, supra note 8.
13. See
Gesets
betreffend
die
Erwerbs-und
Wirtschaftsgenossenschaften
[GENOSSENSCHAFTSGESETZ] [GenG] [Cooperatives Act], May I, 1889, BGBL. as amended,
§ 9 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/geng/gesamt.pdf
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Cooperatives Act].
14. See Bilrgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ
UNO FUR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ (Aug. 18, 1896), as amended,§§ 21-22 (Ger.), available at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bgb/BJNR001950896.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2014)
[hereinafter Civil Code].
15. See Ingrid Lynn Lenhardt, The Corporate and Tax Advantages of a Limited
Liability Company: A German Perspective, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 551, 552-54 (1996); see
Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung [GMBHG] [Limited Liability
Companies Act], (Apr. 20, 1892), as amended (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/gmbhg/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Limited Liability Companies
Act].
16. See Limited Liability Companies Act§ 5 (Ger.).
17. See id. § 7(2).
18. See id. § 8.
19. See Lenhardt, supra note 15, at 557-58 (smaller GmbHs may opt for dual
governance if they so desire).
20. See id. at 562 (the GmbH is also the entity of choice for sole proprietors and
partnerships).
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subsidiaries of foreign corporations. 21

B. German Cooperatives
The history of modern cooperatives in Germany dates to the
Cooperative Act of 1889. 22 Legal changes in 1933 and 1973 moved the
Cooperative Law in the direction of increasingly limited liability,
including cooperatives where members bore no liability whatsoever. 23
In 2006, further amendments resolved issues concerning the
management and supervisory boards, permitting, for example, oneperson management boards in cooperatives with few members. 24
German law distinguishes cooperatives from other business entities
on three bases: cooperatives do not pursue "corporate" profit, instead
seeking profit and advantage for their members; 25 they are not closed in
terms of membership, which may fluctuate; 26 and finally, their
democratic administration. 27 Contemporary German legal scholars tend
to place greater emphasis on the last aspect, which contrasts with the
typical "top-down" structure of corporations. 28
The Cooperative Law requires that every cooperative have a
management board. 29 It also requires a supervisory board, on which at
least three persons must serve without compensation. 30 Members of

21. See id. at 553 (two examples noted are Bosch GmbH and IBM Deutschland
GmbH).
22. See Cooperatives Act (Ger.) (stating the date of issue as May 1, 1889).
23. See Udo Kornblum, Das Weiterleben der Genossenschaft, IN RECHT, GERICHT,
GENOSSENSCHAFT UND POLICEY: STUDIEN ZU GRUNDBEGRIFFEN DER GERMANISTISCHEN
RECHTSHISTORIE, 168, 174 (1986) (noting the [West] German legislature's express intent to
permit cooperatives without member liability); see also Christoph Bernhardt, Wir bauen
eine neue Stadt - Im Verein gegen die Wohnungsnot, DIE ZEIT (June 25, 2012, 3:39 PM),
available at http://www.zeit.de/2013/22/geschichte-baugenossenschaften-wohnen (last
visited Nov. 16, 2014) (detailing the genesis of housing cooperatives from the nineteenth
century to the present).
24. Cooperatives Act§§ 24, 36 (Ger.).
25. Id. § 24(3).
26. See Wolfgang Kohte, Die Genossenschaft- eine Rechtsform mit Zukunft? - neue
Impulse aus Brussel fur eine alte Rechtsform, 12 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 905,
906 (1991).
27. See id.; Cooperatives Act§ I (Ger.).
28. See Volker Beuthien, Die eingetragene Genossenschaft als verbundenes
Unternehmen, in DAS GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT DER KONZERNE IM INTERNATIONALEN
VERGLEICH, 133, 135 (1991) (contrasting the top-to-bottom 'command path' of conventional
business entities with the collective, democratic decision-making process in cooperatives);
Kornblum, supra note 23, at 168.
29. Cooperatives Act§ 9 (Ger.).
30. Id. §§ 9, 36. (German: "Aufsichtsrat"; cooperatives with under twenty members are
allowed one-person management boards).
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both boards must also be members of the cooperative. 31 Although
recent amendments to the law have expanded supervisory and
management board members' power to act on behalf of the cooperative,
the General Assembly remains the main decision-making body of
cooperatives. 32 Indeed, the law expressly prohibits investor vetoes of
members' decisions. 33
The Cooperative Law also specifies that the investment
contributions made by members to obtain membership must comprise at
least a tenth of the cooperative's total assets. 34 In keeping with the
principle that cooperatives serve to benefit their members, the
Cooperative Law provides for a default procedure in the distribution of
profits that all cooperatives must follow absent an explicit procedure set
out in the cooperative' s charter. 35 However, even where cooperatives
develop their own procedures, profits are paid out to members in
portions equal to their shares-cooperatives may regulate how profits
are disbursed, but not the amount. 36
The 1973 and 2006 amendments to the Cooperative Law have
permitted the acquisition of more than one share by members, although
the rule of "one man, one vote" still defines cooperative governance. 37
A cooperative' s charter may even require members to purchase more
than one share, but only if the requirement is enforced on an equal basis
for all members. 38 Dissolution of a cooperative requires a three-quarters
majority vote of its members. 39
Probably the single most defining feature of the Cooperative Law
in comparison to other countries is its placement of regulatory power in
private, non-state hands. 40 All cooperatives are required to join a
Cooperative Auditing Association ("CAA"), which acts as a quasiCooperatives with less than
governmental regulatory agency. 41
31. Id.§ 9.
32. Id. § 8(2).
33. Id. ("the Charter may provide for ... the admittance of investing members [but]
must insure through appropriate bylaws that investing members are in no instance able to
overrule [the decision of] other members").
34. Cooperatives Act§ 7 (Ger.).
35. See id. § 19 (for example, a cooperative ' s charter may provide that profits flow into
financial reserves instead).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 7(a); see Kornblum, supra note 23 at 168 (cooperatives may also restrict the
acquisition of additional shares in any way they see fit).
38. Cooperatives Act§ 7(a) (Ger.).
39. See id. § 78.
40. See id. §§ 53-55.
41. See id. § 54 (German: "Prtifungsverband").
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€2,000,000 in assets must submit to inspection every two years, while
those with more undergo yearly inspections. 42 This is a fairly invasive
process in which an inspector from the CAA receives full access to
ledgers, financial statements, financial instruments and even the
cooperative' s goods and wares. 43

C. German Non-Pro.fit Entities
Non-profit entities typically take the form of registered or
Within each category
unregistered associations in Germany. 44
associations are further divided between for-profit and non-profit
associations. 45 Registered associations, as their name implies, are
registered with a local court agency, which approves or rejects its
charter. 46
Unregistered associations may become active almost
immediately without registration. 47 Both registered and unregistered
associations may acquire interests in LLCs, even as non-profits,
although in practice local court agencies have been loathe to allow
unregistered associations to do so. 48 In all other respects, such as the
liability of an association's officers, associations are generally treated
like other corporate entities. 49

II. SPANISH LAW, REGULATIONS, AND PRACTICES
Spanish law provides for LLCs and the relevant laws are
comparable to those of Germany and the U.S.50 By contrast, the

42. Id.§ 53.
43. Cooperatives Act§ 57 (Ger.).
44. Civil Code §§ 21-22, 54 (Ger.) (German: "Verein"); see MI ETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT,
HANDBUCH 5 (2013) (handbook of the Mietshauser Syndikat, on file with author)
[hereinafter HANDBUCH].
45. See Civil Code §§ 21-22, 54 (Ger.) (non-profit associations enjoy several
advantages, chief among them favorable tax treatment).
46. Id. (German: "Amtsgericht"); see HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 5 (identifying
language that is decisive in a local court agency's determination of whether an association is
for-profit or not-for-profit).
47. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 5.
48. See id. at 5 (identifying language that is decisive in a local court agency's
determination of whether an association is for-profit or not-for-profit).
49. See Civil Code §§ 31-31 b (Ger.) (liability of an association for its representatives
and personal liability of board members); Limited Liability Companies Act§§ 13, 15 (Ger.).
50. See CODIGO DE COMERCIO [C. COM. 1889] [Commercial Code] art. 125, 145
(Spain), available at http://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1885-6627 (last visited
Sept. 15, 2014); Limited Liability Companies Act §§ 5-7 (Ger.); UNIFORM LTD. LtAB. Co.
ACT (1994) (amended 2006), available at http: //www.uniformlaws.org/shared/
docs/limited%20liability°/o20company/ullca_ final_ 06rev. pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2014 ).
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Spanish Cooperative Law is much more flexible than its counterparts,
providing for the organization of cooperatives in larger "second-degree"
cooperatives and permitting legal entities to acquire interests in
cooperatives. 51 Spanish non-profit entities, like those in Germany and
the U.S., are also permitted to acquire interests in other entities and may
be organized democratically. 52
A. The Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada: The Spanish LLC
Limited liability companies in Spain are founded through
execution of a deed in the presence of a public notary and registration
with the Mercantile Registry. 53 Spanish law requires €3,000 starting
capital and LLCs are not permitted to issue shares but instead divide
their capital into "participation interests," which non-partner investors
may acquire. 54 LLC partners bear no personal liability for company
debts and directors are liable solely to the partners and the holders of
participation interests. 55 The partners and participation holders elect the
directors and may remove them. 56 Other entities, whether businesses or
non-profits, may acquire interests in Spanish LLCs. 57
B. Spanish Cooperatives

Cooperatives were not a prominent component of the Spanish
economy until the second half of the 20th century. 58 The earliest modem
legislation concerning cooperatives was the Associations Act of 1887
and the Farm Unions Act of 1906, which provided a legal framework
for agricultural cooperatives and led to the rapid proliferation of farm
unions. 59 This process continued during the Second Republic 60 and the
51. Cooperative Law arts. 8, 12 (B.O.E. 1999, 27) (Spain), available at
https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1999-15681 (last visited Oct. 28, 2014).
52. See id. art. 5(2).
53. Commercial Code art. 125, 145 (Spain).
54. See id. art. 125; Limited Liability Company Law art. 4 (B.O.E 1995, 2) (Spain),
available at https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1995/03/24/pdfs/A09181-09206.pdf (last visited
Nov. 16, 2014) (the text of the law still lists the amount in pesetas, so the amount of 3,000 €
is an approximation).
55. Commercial Code arts. 127, 147 (Spain).
56. See id. art. 125.
57. Limited Liability Company Law art. 87 (Spain) (defining when an LLC is
considered "dominant" in relation to another).
58. See Juan Francisco Julia Igual & Sergio Mari Vidal, Farm Cooperatives and the
Social Economy: The Case of Spain, 30 J. RURAL COOPERATION 119, 121-22 (2002),
available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/handle/59573 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
59. See id. at 121-22; WILLIAM FOOTE WHYTE & KATHLEEN KING WHYTE, MAKING
MONDRAGON: THE GROWTH AND DYNAMICS OF THE WORKER COOPERATIVE COMPLEX 18-19
(2d ed. 1991) (noting that the first recorded consumer cooperative was in 1880, preceding
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Spanish Civil War, only to be abruptly altered following the victory of
the Falangistas under Francisco Franco. 61 Nevertheless, the role of
cooperatives in the Spanish economy continued to grow and during the
transitional years of the Third Republic, two legislative acts 62 shifted the
focus to actively fostering business development. 63
The prominence of cooperatives in Spain's economy is largely due
to the Mondragon Cooperatives, founded in 1956. 64 This initial workerowned and -managed enterprise flowered into an extensive and highly
variegated cooperative network, discussed in detail below. 65 In terms of
its influence on the Spanish economy, Mondragon demonstrated that
worker cooperatives were economically viable and could serve as
engines of prosperity. 66 As an example of cooperatives' present role in
the Spanish economy, at the dawn of this century in the agricultural
sector alone there were nearly 4,000 cooperatives with over a million
members. 67
Spanish cooperatives are governed by the country's Cooperative
Law, although the Commercial Code also applies under certain
circumstances. 68 The Cooperative Act provides for two types of
cooperatives: first- and second-degree cooperatives. 69 A first-degree
the Cooperative Act by some seven years).
60. See Igual & Vidal, supra note 58, at 122 (the 1931 Cooperatives Act also provided
for a cooperative registry maintained by the Ministry of Labor that would give cooperatives
legal standing); WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 18-21.
61. See George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia, LIBCOM.ORG 3-4 (1938), available at
http://libcom.org/files/Homage%20to%20Catalonia%20-%20George%200rwell.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 16, 2014) (containing the famed author's first-hand account of the economic
changes undertaken during the Spanish Civil War); see also Igual & Vidal, supra note 58, at
122 (the 1942 Cooperatives Act enabled the official trade union to veto candidates in
cooperative elections).
62. The Cooperatives General Act of 1974 and the Regulations for Cooperative
Societies, passed in 1978. See lgual & Vidal, supra note 58, at 122.
63. See id. at 122.
available at http://www.mondragon64. See MONDRAGON CORPORATION,
corporation.com/eng/co-operative-experience/history/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2014) (relating
the significant early dates in the cooperatives' development).
65. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 32-35.
66. See id. at 46-48; Christopher S. Axworthy, Worker Co-Operatives in Mondragon,
the UK. and France: Some Reflections, UNIVER. SASKATCHEWAN CENTRE FOR THE STUDY
OF Co-OPERATIVES: OCCASIONAL PAPERS 3 (1985).
67. lgual & Vidal, supra note 58, at 123. Moreover, in 1996 agricultural cooperatives
were responsible for 45% of Spain's fruit produce, 15% of vegetable produce, 27% of milk
production and 20% of its cereal production. Id. at 125.
68. Cooperatives Law art. 1 (Spain) ("[L]as cooperativas de producci6n ... quedaran
sujetas a las disposiciones de este C6digo cuando se dedicaren a actos de comercio extrafios
a la mutalidad.").
69. See id. arts. 1, 7-8, 12.
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cooperative is constituted by at least three persons (natural, juridical or
both), while a second-degree cooperative consists of two or more
cooperatives organized in a network. 7° Founding both types requires
execution of a public deed registered with the local Registry of
Cooperatives. 71 The deed must contain a number of key pieces of
information, including by-laws, identification of members, as well as
evidence that they have invested the funds necessary to become
members. 72
Under the Spanish Cooperative Act, all members of the
cooperative have the right to participate in the decision-making process,
although it permits unequal influence on the basis of unequal
investment. 73 A member of a first-degree cooperative may not obtain
more than a third of the voting share. 74 Cooperatives may also establish
special voting regimes for certain situations, e.g. total voting equality
among members when deciding whether to dissolve. 75 To alter the
cooperatives by-laws, dissolve or merge with another cooperative, or
convert the cooperative into another entity, a two-thirds majority of
votes is required by law. 76
With regard to second-degree cooperatives, legal entities other than
cooperatives may attain membership. 77 Non-cooperative entities may
not make up more than 45% of the membership, although in contrast to
first-degree cooperatives member entities are permitted to acquire more
than a 30% capital interest in the second-degree cooperative. 78
However, the relationship between first- and second-degree
cooperatives is not merely constitutive under Spanish law, but is instead
conceived as a hierarchical relationship in which the second-degree
cooperative commands and controls the first-degree cooperative. 79

70. See id. arts. 8, 12.
71 . See id. art. 7 (Spanish: "Registro de Sociedades Cooperativas").
72. Id. art. 10; see also FERNANDO POMBO, DOING BUSINESS IN SPAIN § 12.04[2] (2012).
73. Cooperative Law art. 1, 26 (Spain).
74. See id. art. 26 ("[L]os Estatutos fijaran con claridad los criterios de
proporcionalidad, sin que el numero de votos de un socio pueda ser superior al tercio de los
votos totales de la cooperativa").
75. See id. art. 26(7) ("[L]os Estatutos deberan regular los supuestos en que sera
imperativo el voto igualitario").
76. Id. art. 28.
77. See id. art. 77 ("Tambien pueden integrarse en calidad de socios otras personas
juridicas, publicas o privadas y empresarios individuales, hasta un maximo del cuarenta y
cinco por ciento del total de los socios").
78. See Cooperative Law art. 77 (Spain).
79. See id. art. 17, 78( l ).
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C. Spanish Non-Profit Entities

The standard non-profit entity in Spain is the non-profit
association. 80 Spanish non-profit associations must show at the time of
incorporation that they have a social purpose, e.g. the defense of human
rights, the promotion of volunteerism or advancing the "social
economy." 81 Such associations must use at least 70% of their corporate
income for that stated purpose. 82 Although formally subject to
corporate taxes, a number of types of income are exempt, including
donations and any dividends from interests in other entities. 83 The
process of incorporation is largely identical to that of other corporate
entities except that the entity is entered into a separate registry for such
non-profit associations. 84

III. U.S. LAW, REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES
In the Republic's early history, corporations were relatively
unimportant, there being only 317 at the dawn of the 19th century by one
count. 85 This changed rapidly, however, and by the end of the 19th
century the U.S. boasted some of the largest and most successful
corporations in the world. 86 This development has continued into the
present, with the LLC representing a recent addition to U.S. business
entities. 87 As in Europe, U.S. cooperatives can trace their roots back to
early 1800s but did not attain any economic significance until the 20th
In contrast to their counterparts, however, worker
century. 88
80. Law on the Fiscal Regime for Non-Profit Entities and Charitable Incentives,
Declaration
of
Motives
II
(B.O.E.
2002,
49)
(Spain),
available
at
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/12/24/pdfs/A45229-45243.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014)
(Spanish: "entidad sin fines lucrativos").
81. See id. art. 3(1) ("de fomenta de la economia social").
82. See id. art. 3(2).
83. See id. art. 6(2) ("Estan exentas ... los dividendos y participaciones en beneficios de
sociedades").
84. See id. art. 3(7).
85. Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations,
15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 300 (1990).
86. See MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS: THE GREAT AMERICAN
CAPITALISTS 1861-1901, at 253-64, 284-87 (Transaction Publishers 2011) (1934). This
classic of American history offers a particular focus on the titans of industry that helped
make the U.S. "in very short order the premier industrial nation of the world." Id. at 254.
87. Prefatory Note, UNIFORM LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT (1994) (amended 2006), available at
http://www. uni formlaws. org/shared/docs/limited%20 liabi l it)'°/o20company/ul lea_final_ 06re
v.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
88. See Christine A. Varney, The Capper-Volstead, Agricultural Cooperatives and
Antitrust Immunity, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 1-3 (Dec. 2010), available at
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cooperatives are often defined narrowly, precluding the acquisition of
an interest by another legal entity, and state laws often make no
provision for a cooperative network. 89 U.S. non-profits generally enjoy
the same powers as their European counterparts, including the
acquisition of interests in business entities and determination of their
own structure and by-laws. 90
A. US. Limited Liability Companies

State legislatures have been the primary agents in the creation and
spread of the LLC as a legal entity. 91 The first state to introduce this
particular form was Wyoming in 1977 but by the time the Uniform Law
Commission promulgated its Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
in 1996 a majority of state legislatures had provided for LLCs. 92 The
LLC is meant to provide the "pass-through" tax advantages of a
partnership (from which the form is derived) and the liability
advantages of a corporation. 93
The federal structure of the United States affords a high degree of
sovereignty to individual states such that the regulation of LLCs across
the country is subject to variation. 94 As a result, the focus here will be
on federal regulation and those requirements common to most, if not all,
states so as to offer a general impression of LLC formation and
regulation in the U.S. 95
Limited Liability Companies are formed by filing articles of
organization, often with the local secretary of state. 96 The articles of
organization must indicate the name of the LLC, its location and
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ aba/pub lishing/antitrust_source/Dec I O_Varney 12
_21.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (summarizing the early growth of
agricultural cooperatives and attendant legislation).
89. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 157A, § 7 (West 2014).
90. See generally 26 U.S .C. § 501(c) (2014).
91. See Prefatory Note, UNIFORM LTD. LIAB. Co. AcT 1 (1994) (amended 2006),
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability°/o20company/
ullca_final_06rev.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
92. See id. at 2.
93. See id. at 1-6.
94. See generally Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence
favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1800-02, 1812-17
(2002) (noting the variety and effect of state anti-takeover statutes in retaining in-state
corporations and attracting out-of-state corporations).
95. The Uniform Law Commission's revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
will figure prominently here. See UNIFORM LTD. LIAB. Co. AcT (1994) (amended 2006),
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability%20company/
ullca_final_06rev.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
96. See id. § 201.
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identify stakeholders. 97 Many state laws set as a default equal
distributions by the LLC to its members but all permit unequal
distribution schemes by agreement. 98 An LLC is prohibited from
making distributions that would hinder its ability to satisfy outstanding
debts. 99 The Uniform Act also provides that an LLC is a membermanaged entity unless the operating agreement explicitly provides
otherwise. 100 While state taxation of Limited Liability Companies
vary, 101 the IRS will generally treat LLC members as partners and
affords them a partnership's income "pass-through" advantage,
preventing the "double-taxation" that standard corporations
experience. 102
B. U.S. Cooperatives

The earliest U.S. cooperatives were developed in the agricultural
sector and continued to increase in influence until by the mid-20th
century cooperatives were mainstays of farming, husbandry and foodproduction. 103 These were the first cooperatives to receive any
legislative treatment at the federal or state levels, notably the provisions
of the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922 that immunized agricultural
cooperatives from anti-trust legislation. 104 Another common example is
the cooperative credit union, which was introduced to the United States
from Germany via Quebec, with the first cooperative credit union in the
U.S. opening its doors in Manchester, New Hampshire in 1908. 105 Over
97. See id. (the Uniform Act provides for the formation of an LLC even when no
members are yet named).
98. See id. § 405 .
99. See id.
100. See UNIFORM LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT§ 407 (1994) (amended 2006), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability<>/o20company/ullca_ final_ 06re
v.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (this section also contains detailed provisions for the
appointment and removal of managers, as well as the effects of dissociating a member who
is also a manager).
101. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, available at
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Lim ited-LiabilityCompany-LLC (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
102. See id. (single-member LLCs are deemed entities that are not separate from the
owner for income tax, but separate for employment and some excise taxes).
103. See Varney, supra note 88, at 1.
104. See id. at 1, 4; 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (2010) (providing for administrative action
against cooperatives that restrain trade in the place of judicial action). Pending class action
suits may re-define some cooperative's immunity to anti-trust actions. See In re Fresh &
Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106666, 6-7 (D. Idaho July 27,
2012).
105. See W ENDELL V. FOUNTAIN, THE N EW EMERGING CREDIT UNION WORLD: THEORY,
PROCESS, PRACTICE CASES & APPLICATION 9 (2d Edition 2012). An excellent summary of
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the next decades credit unions spread across the country, culminating in
the Federal Credit Union Act of 1934, a national regimen for chartering
and supervising credit unions. 106 Workers' cooperatives, by contrast,
long operated without specific statutory provision until the advent of
Massachusetts' General Law 157A in 1982. 107
As in Europe, regulations concerning cooperatives followed their
spread through the United States. 108 Among the states there is some
variation: some address only agricultural cooperatives and treat others
more or less the same as other corporate entities, 109 but a few have
established specific legal regimens for cooperatives. 110 Incorporation of
a cooperative mirrors that of a corporation in many respects: the
prospective founders file a certificate of incorporation with the relevant
agency, usually the secretary of state, which includes all essential
information concerning contact information, the identity of the interestholders, whether and in what amounts stock will be offered, etc. 111
the early genesis of credit unions is available from the NATIONAL CREDIT UNION
ADMINISTRATION, available at http://www.ncua.gov/about/history/Pages/CUHistory.aspx
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014). La Caisse Populaire, Ste-Marie is still an active credit union in
Manchester, NH, available at http://www.stmarysbank.com/about-st-marys-bank/ourhistory.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
106. Specifically, the Federal Credit Union Act provided for the creation of the
National Credit Union Administration with the power to charter credit unions, collect fees,
provide share insurance for members and ensure credit unions' compliance with regulatory
directives. Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1752a, 1755, 1781, 1785,
1790d (2013).
107. See David Ellerman & Peter Pitegoff, The Democratic Corporation: The New
Worker Cooperative Statute in Massachusetts, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 441, 44243 (1983).
108. See Sean Flynn, A Short History of Cooperative Law and Regulation Reform in
Developing Countries, in U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, ENABLING
COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES FOR LEGAL REFORM 43 (2006) (noting that
cooperatives in North America and Europe developed in a bottom-up fashion and that "laws
generally followed and recognized the initial development of a cooperative sector").
109. This has sometimes forced would-be cooperators to form a corporation with
altered by-laws. MGL J57a, the Massachusetts Statute for Employee Cooperative
Corporations, AM. COOPERATIVE WORKER (Jan. 29, 2011, 10:57 AM), available at
http://www.american.coop/node/275 (last visited Oct. 28, 2014); see Lynn Pitman, Limited
Cooperative Association Statutes: An Update 2 (Univ. of Wis. Ctr. for Coops., Staff Paper
No. 7, April 2008).
110. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-111 to -118 (2013); North Carolina Co-op Law
Information,
Co-OP
LA w.ORG,
available
at
http://www.cooplaw.org/statebystate/northcarolina/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2014) (commenting
on the North Carolina Cooperative Associations Statute); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 157A
(West 1982).
111. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 155 (West 2004) (general corporate law providing
for incorporation of all "business corporations"); N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ 54-113 (last amended
1985); N.Y. CooP. CORP. LAW arts. 2, § 11, 15 (McKinney 2013) (indicating the required
contents of the certificate and filing with the secretary of state).
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However, some states provide for particular protections for
cooperatives, a common one being prohibitions on the use of the word
"cooperative" in the name of any entity not conforming with the
statutory definition. 112 Some states also require that only members have
the power to amend a cooperative's by-laws, excluding non-member
stockholders from management decisions. 113 Furthermore, states that
have specific provisions for workers cooperatives often preclude legal
entities from acquiring a voting share in the enterprise. 114
Under federal tax law cooperatives are categorized as "Farmers'
Tax Exempt Cooperatives" or "Non-Exempt Cooperatives," meaning
that non-agricultural cooperatives must pay corporate income tax. 115
However, like LLCs, cooperatives are permitted to "pass through"
corporate income to their members without paying corporate income
tax. 116 State taxation can vary but cooperatives are usually taxed at the
same rate as other corporate entities. 117 Yet, in some cases, states tack
closely to federal law, exempting some types of cooperatives entirely. 11 8

C. U.S. Non-Profit Entities
Although non-profits are incorporated at the state level, Federal
law plays an outsized role in their foundation and operation because
112. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 157, § 8 (West 2014) (providing that any corporate
entity using the word "co-operative" that is not structured in accordance with the statutory
requirements for cooperatives "shall forfeit to the commonwealth not more than ten dollars
for every day ... such name or title is so used" and potentially face injunctions against
continued operation); N.Y. COOP. CORP. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2014) (requiring
cooperatives to use the word "cooperative" in their names).
113. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 157A, § 7 (West 2014) ("No capital stock other
than membership shares shall be given voting power in an employee cooperative."); N.H.
Rev. STAT. ANN. § 301-A:1 (2014) (defining consumer cooperatives as entities in which
"each member has one and only one vote" and in which "voting by proxy is prohibited.").
114. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 157A, § 7 (West 2014).
115. See Instructions for Form 1120-C, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVIC E 7 (2013),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/il 120c.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); 26
U.S.C. § 521 (2004).
116. See 26 U.S.C. § 1382(b) (2014) (this income is termed "patronage").
117. For example, North Carolina taxes cooperatives at the same rate as other corporate
entities, although it applies federal deductions for patronage dividends. Tax Rate and Basis
for
the
Tax,
N.C.
DEP' T
REVENUE,
available
at
http://www.domc.com/taxes/corporate/rate.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); Form CD-418,
N.C. DEP'T REVENUE, available at http://www.domc.com/downloads/cd418.pdf (last visited
Nov. 16, 2014).
118. See Corporate Excise Tax, MASS. DEP'T REVENU E, available at
http://www.mass.gov/dor/businesses/current-tax-info/guide-to-employer-taxobligations/business-income-taxes/corporations/corporate-excise-tax.html (last visited Nov.
16, 2014) (exempting from income tax all corporations organized under Section 501 of the
Internal Revenue Code, including some cooperative corporations).
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they are subject to a special federal tax regimen. 119 As such, most nonprofit entities are identified by their exemption category under the U.S.
Code, e.g. 501(c)(3), 501(c)(6), etc. 120 The statute covers a variety of
entities, including civic leagues, business leagues, and mutual insurance
funds, among others. 121
If an organization qualifies as a 501 (c) entity and receives approval
by the IRS, its corporate income is generally tax-exempt. 122 This status
is subject to section 503(b), which lists prohibited transactions resulting
in denial of tax-exempt status, including overcompensation for personal
services or making the organization's services available on a
preferential basis. 123 Income from trade or business unrelated to the
entity's purpose remains taxable. 124 Important for this article is that
Federal tax law does not distinguish between tax-exempt entities on the
basis of their form of organization, nor does it prescribe any particular
organizational format. 125

IV. ESTABLISHED LARGE-SCALE COOPERATIVE MODELS:
MONDRAGON AND EVERGREEN

A. The Mondragon Cooperative Corporation
The Mondragon Cooperative Corporation grew out of a vocational
school founded by the Catholic priest Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta in
the town of Mondragon in the Basque region of Spain. 126 A number of
Arizmendiarrieta's students, who had moved on to positions in private
enterprises, were dissatisfied with the stratified and adversarial
environment in which they were employed. 127 After unsuccessful
efforts to convince company managers and government officials to
permit worker ownership of enterprises, they turned to their former
teacher for advice. 128
119. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2014).
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2014); 26 U.S.C. § 503 (2014).
123. See 26 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2014).
124. See 26 U.S.C. § 513(a) (2014).
125. See 26 U.S.C. § 503 (2014).
126. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 28-31.
127. See id. at 32.
128. See id. at 33; Fernando Molina, The Spirituality of Economics: Historical Roots of
Mondragon, 1940-1974, in BASQUE COOPERATIVISM 13, 20 (Baleren Bakaikoa & Eneka
Albizu eds., 2011) (relating police suspicion of Arizmendiarrieta, resulting in interference
even with Catholic Youth pilgrimages organized by the priest).
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Arizmendiarrieta and the small group of students chose to form
their own cooperative enterprise and, after prodigious community fundraising and overcoming bureaucratic hurdles, the five students founded
Ulgor and obtained a license to produce home appliances. 129 From 1956
to 1959 the number of "worker-shareholders" increased from 10 to
143. 130 However, the defining act that set the Mondragon project on the
path to success was the founding of the "Caja Laboral Popular" in 1959,
a cooperative banking institution founded specifically to finance the
foundation and operation of worker cooperatives. 131 With the help of
credit extended by this institution, dozens of new worker cooperatives
were established during the 1960s. 132 The Mondragon Cooperative
Corporation continued to grow at a steady pace, numbering 160
cooperatives with 19,000 members by 1985. 133
At present the Mondragon group includes 289 enterprises with
over 80,000 employees. 134 The Mondragon Corporation as a whole is a
highly centralized organization, 135 with several intermediary layers
between the individual cooperatives and the Caja Laboral. 136 For ease
of understanding, the rest of this section moves from the 'bottom' of the
hierarchy (at the level of the individual cooperative) to the 'top' (at the
level of the Caja Laboral).

1. Basic Cooperative Structure
The individual cooperatives have their own internal governance
structure, in which the General Assembly of all cooperative members is
the highest decision-making organ. 137 The General Assembly elects the
Governing Council, which acts as a Board of Directors. 138 The
129. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 34; Molina, supra note 128, at 23.
130. Molina, supra note 128, at 23.
131. Id. at 23-24.
132. Id. at 24.
133. Axworthy, supra note 66, at 3.
134. MONDRAGON
CORPORATION,
available
at
http ://www.mondragoncorporation.com/eng/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (noting that Mondragon enterprises are
present on five continents, including numerous branches in North and South America).
135. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 11.
136. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 36, 59-61.
137. Id. at 35 (Spanish: "Asemblea General"); Governance - Organization,
MONDRAGON
CORPORATION,
available
at
http://www.mondragoncorporation.com/eng/about-us/governance/organization/ (last visited Nov. 15 , 2014).
138. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 35-37 (Spanish: "Junta Rectora"); see
Governance
Organization,
MONDRAGON
CORPORATION,
available
at
http://www.mondragon-corporation. com/eng/about-us/ governance/organization/ (last visited
Nov. 16, 2014) (contrasting boards of directors at other private firms to the Governing
Council, made up exclusively of member-employees of the cooperative).
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Governing Council also appoints the manager of the cooperative and
oversees their activities. 139 All cooperatives also have an Audit
Committee, which monitors the finances of the enterprise, a
Management Council consisting of a cooperative' s manager and
department heads, and the Social Council, which serves as an ersatz
union, advising the Management and Governing Councils on subjects as
varied as compensation plans, working conditions and employment
decisions. 140 These councils facilitate the operations of the cooperative
while also keeping one another in check. 141

2. Intermediate Organizations & "Second-Degree Co-operatives"
Within the Mondragon group individual cooperatives are organized
in second-degree cooperatives. 142 Long-standing examples include the
Caja Laboral Popular (the group's financial institution), Iker/an
(research) and Lagun Aro (social and medical services), but there are
Formally, the
also other industrial or regional organizations. 143
governing structure of these second-degree cooperatives mirrors that of
the individual cooperatives: each cooperative has a single, equal vote
and the cooperatives elect a Governing Council, which appoints the
General Management 144 that coordinates commercial policies. 145 One
significant difference is that persons employed directly in the seconddegree organization are also considered members of that cooperative
and have a right to elect delegates to represent their interests. 146
139. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 37 (supporting both managers and
members of the Governing Council are subject to term limits).
140. See id. at 39-40 (discussing that while the General Council is elected at-large, the
constitution of the Social Council follows a different procedure, one designed to ensure that
it is not dominated by managers or the Governing Council: First, members of the Social
Council are elected from within the departments of the cooperative; second, any member of
the Governing Council drawing the lowest pay grade is automatically a member of the
Social Council, which is meant to ensure that less-skilled or newer members are not unduly
disadvantaged). Social Council, which is meant to ensure that less-skilled or newer
members are not unduly disadvantaged. Id.
141. See id. at 41 (describing how, if a serious disagreement arises between the Social
Council and the Governing Council, the former may refer the issue to the General Assembly
for all cooperative members to decide).
142. See id. at 59-60. I have chosen to use the term "second-degree cooperative"
because it is the most direct translation from the Spanish term and is common in both the
relevant laws and in most scholarly works. See id.
143. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 3 (explaining the individual cooperatives are also
linked to Eroski, the consumers' cooperative).
144. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 60 (Spanish: "direcci6n general").
145. See id. at 60.
146. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 3 (this includes the Caja Laboral, discussed in
greater detail in the next section).
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Another is that the second-degree cooperative management both enjoys
significant latitude in directing the actions of member cooperatives and
is largely insulated from the individual cooperatives' control. 147
Second-degree cooperatives also pool profits and losses across their
members and facilitate labor transfers among cooperatives, reducing
redundancies or expanding workforces as needed. 148
3. The Caja Laboral Popular as a Managing Entity

In theory, all second-degree cooperatives enjoy equal standing, but
in practice the Caja Laboral Popular is the nerve center of Mondragon,
holding member equity, managing savings accounts and making loans
to member cooperatives. 149 Although nominally just the Mondragon
"bank," the Caja wields considerable influence through its
"Entrepreneurial Division," which controls the expansion and
development of the entire group. 150 The Caja is headed by a governing
council of twelve members, eight drawn from the individual
cooperatives and four from Caja employees. 151 The representatives
from the cooperatives are usually top management figures from the
larger and more influential enterprises. 152
The Caja's Entrepreneurial Division assesses all proposals for new
cooperatives, which take the form of loan applications by the
prospective cooperative members to the Caja. 153 If the Caja deems the
project a worthy addition to the group, the new cooperative enters into a
"contract of association." 154 This contract not only governs the
cooperative's relationship with the Mondragon group but also
prescribes a specific organizational framework. 155 For example, the
contract mandates democratic control by cooperative members and lays
out the procedures for making decisions. 156 The cooperative is barred
from discriminating on the basis of political association, religion or
gender and obligated to stay under a maximum ratio of non-member to
147. Cooperative Law art. 17, 78(1) (Spain).
148. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 61.
149. See id. at 52.
150. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 3; WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 69.
151. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 68.
152. See id. at 68 (quoting a conversation with then-chairman of the Caja, Alfonso
Gorrofiogoitia, as indicating that the "top industrial leaders of the complex ... usually
dominate the council").
153. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 5.
154. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 69.
155. See id. at 36, 69 (referring to the chart on page 36 that represents the typical
structure of a Mondragon cooperative).
156. See id. at 69-70.
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member employees. 157
The contract of association compels the
cooperative to submit to audits every four years and to maintain a twoto-one ratio in capital reserves versus borrowed capital. 158
The contract of association also grants the Caja considerable power
to intervene in the internal affairs of individual cooperatives. 159 All
Mondragon cooperatives must deposit a portion of their surplus income
with the Caja, enabling it to offer loans to prospective cooperatives at
better rates. 160 If a cooperative fails to make loan payments or fulfill
any of its obligations under the contract of association, the Caja may
intervene directly, even appointing a manager on its own authority. 161
While at times essential to ensuring the financial health and stability of
the Mondragon group as a whole, such intrusive power suggests that the
formally democratic Mondragon structure is tempered by a heavy dose
of patemalism. 162 Furthermore, descriptions of the Caja's working
culture indicate that many Caja employees treat Mondragon as a
business that happens to consist of cooperatives, rather than a group of
cooperatives doing business. 163

B. The Evergreen Cooperatives
The Evergreen Cooperative Corporation ("ECC") is the product of
an effort by Cleveland area institutions to create sustainable living-wage
jobs in low-income areas. 164 In 2009 the first two cooperatives,

157. See id. at 69-70 (noting that in the 1980s non-members were not permitted to
make up more than 10% of a cooperative's workforce. With the rapid expansion of
Mondragon since 1992, this principle has given way to greater numbers of non-member
employees, the bulk of which are located outside the Basque country); see Co-operative
Experience - FAQs - How Many of Your Employees are Cooperative Members and How
Many are Not?, MONDRAGON CORPORATION, available at http://www.mondragoncorporation.com/eng/co-operative-experience/faqs/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (noting that
the company's figures put the global proportion of member-employees at about 33%,
although a plan for extending membership to all Eroski employees foresees 75% global
membership within three years).
158. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 70.
159. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 6; WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 179-80.
160. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 6.
161. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 178-81.
162. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 7, 11-12 (noting that the attitude and bearing
among Caja employees "was aloof and [they] appeared not to be part of the workforce." He
also noted that Caja employees referred to other cooperative workers "as being uneducated,
glad of a job, not very knowledg[ e]able about the business of their co-operatives, even [as]
peasants.").
163. See id. at 7; WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 178-81 (demonstrating that the
Intervention Department, which oversees the restructuring and management of cooperatives
in financial distress, is a salient example of the technocratic character of the Caja).
164. See The Evergreen Cooperatives Story, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (2012),
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Evergreen Cooperative Laundry and Ohio Cooperative Solar, opened
for business. 165 Green City Growers, the largest urban hydroponic food
production greenhouse in the U.S., began operations in 2011 and made
its first harvest in early 2013. 166 The ECC acts as a "holding company"
that manages the cooperatives and guides business development, with a
long-term goal of creating "a robust network" of enterprises that
emphasizes environmental sustainability and "green collar" jobs. 167
During the planning leading up to the foundation of the ECC,
representatives from the participating institutions visited Mondragon
cooperatives in Spain and actively adopted a number of its
organizational aspects. 168 The single greatest similarity is the presence
of an "umbrella organization, modeled on Mondragon's [Caja Laboral],
to be the keeper of its 'vision' and a source of continuity for all of its
cooperative enterprises." 169 The following description of the ECC's
structure will start at the top and move down to the ground-level
organizations.
1. The Evergreen Cooperative Corporation
A fifteen person Board of Directors governs the ECC and includes
representatives from the founding "anchor institution[ s,]" investors and
representatives from the individual cooperatives. 170 Parallel to the ECC
and answering to the Board of Directors are an Executive Committee
and an Audit and Finance Credit Committee. 171
Directly under the ECC are the Evergreen Cooperative
Development Fund, the Evergreen Land Trust, the Evergreen Business
Services LLC and the cooperatives themselves. 172 The ECC is the sole
available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/about/evergreen-story/ (last visited Oct. 23,
2014) (noting the institutions include the Cleveland Foundation, local hospitals, Case
Western Reserve University and the city government); see also Sara Tonnesen, Note,

Stronger Together: Worker Cooperatives as a Community Economic Development Strategy,
20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 187, 195 (2012).
165. Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 7.
166. See id.; see also Green City Growers Cooperative: The Third Evergreen Company
is Open for Business!, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (Feb. 28, 2013), available at
http://evergreencooperatives.com/2013/02/green-city-growers-cooperative-the-thirdevergreen-company-is-open-for-business/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
167. See Vision & Broad Goals, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (2012), available at
http://evergreencooperatives.com/about/mission-goals-and-principles/ (last visited Oct. 24,
2014).
168. See Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 6.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 14.
171. See id.
172. See id.
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member of the Evergreen Cooperative Development Fund, whose
director belongs to the ECC management staff. 173 The ECC also has
sole control over the Evergreen Land Trust, whose aim is the
acquisition of "logistically advantageous sites for future enterprises"
and the preservation of manageable start-up costs for new businesses. 174
The Evergreen Business Services LLC is also controlled directly by the
ECC, focusing on "driving revenue, profitability, and new business
growth through existing and new Evergreen related enterprises." 175
None of these LLCs are cooperatives and there is no provision for the
representation of these entities' employees on the ECC board of
directors. 176 The ECC also has direct representation in each individual
cooperative as well as a 20% stake in the enterprise. 177 In contrast to
Mondragon, the ECC currently appoints managers for the individual
cooperatives. 178
2. The Structure of the Individual Evergreen Cooperatives

The individual cooperatives, currently three in number, 179 were
conceived as democratic institutions. 180 Enfranchisement comes with
full membership, which requires acceptance by the majority of current
members and then the purchase, in installments, of an equal share in the
cooperative. 181 However, this represents the extent of the public
information concerning the individual cooperatives' govemmg

173. See Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 14; see also Structure & Leadership,
EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (2012), available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/
about/structure-leadership/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014 ).
174. See Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 17.
175. Businesses - Evergreen Business Services, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (2012),
available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/businesses/evergreen-business-services/ (last
visited Oct. 24, 2014 ).
176. See generally Structure & Leadership, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (2012),
available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/about/structure-leadership/ (last visited Oct.
24, 2014).
177. Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 14.
178. See Structure & Leadership, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (2012), available at
http://evergreencooperatives.com/about/structure-leadership/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014)
(describing that the managers of the three cooperatives are staff employed directly by the
ECC).
179. Id. (Evergreen Cooperative Laundry, Evergreen Energy Solutions and Green City
Growers Cooperative).
180. Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 22.
181. See Introduction to the Evergreen Cooperatives 2.0, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES
(Oct. 15, 2011), available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/201 l/10/new-videointroduction-to-the-evergreen-cooperatives-2-0/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014) (promotional
video produced by the Evergreen Cooperatives presenting the ECC model).
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structure. 182
The ECC has published no information regarding the ratio of
member to non-member employees, although the stated goal of the
organization is to rapidly increase both the number of employees and
members. 183 In its publications and presentations, the ECC has been
silent concerning the cooperatives' governance, by-laws and decisionmaking process. 184 This contrasts sharply with its general affirmations
of workplace democracy, which figure prominently in its public
message. 185 The ECC's vagueness about the implementation of
democratic management is especially odd given its willingness to
regularly present business and accounting information to the public. 186
Financial transparency is itself both welcome and necessary, given that
the ECC is funded and continues to be guided by several large partner
organizations. 187 Yet, a significant part of the ECC' s appeal is that it
envisions not only job creation but also democratic economic
development. 188 The dearth of information on this subject can only
stimulate speculation and provoke questions as to the extent of the
ECC 's commitment to workplace democracy. 189
182. See id.
183. Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 8 (the Evergreen Laundry employed 21
people as of 2011 but aims to employ 50 once it reached full operational capacity).
184. The only specific detail yielded in the various ECC materials was the statement by
one employee-owner that cooperative members voted on whether to grant membership to a
probational employee. Introduction to the Evergreen Cooperatives 2.0, EVERGREEN
COOPERATIVES (Oct. 15, 2011), available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/201 l/10/newvideo-introduction-to-the-evergreen-cooperatives-2-0/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
185. Id.; Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 22 (Ted Howard, co-founder of the
Democracy Collaborative, one of the principal institutions involved in the development of
the ECC: "The way our economic system works today at all levels, you go to work and hang
your democratic rights at the door. . . . The Evergreen model is about people determining
together whether they give themselves a raise, how much goes into their pocket today and
how much goes for the future."); About, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVE LAUNDRY, available at
http://evergreencooperatives.com/business/evergreen-laundry/about/ (last visited Oct. 27,
2014) (the Evergreen Cooperative Laundry web site introduces its CEO, apparently
appointed by the ECC, followed by a brief mention of the "worker-owners," described as
the "heart of the company").
186. See Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 8, 11-12 (publishing the lending
arrangements as well as providing information concerning the actual and projected
performance of each cooperative).
187. See id. at 4.
188. The novelty of democratic enterprises of scale has attracted considerable attention,
including a prominent place in the documentary SHIFT CHANGE (Moving Images 2012), in
Now: Fixing the Future (PBS broadcast Nov. 17, 2010) and Al-Jazeera, Fault Lines:
Working through the US Jobs Crisis (Aug. 29, 2010), available at,
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/faultlines/2010/04/2010481251991166.html
(last
visited Nov. 16, 2014).
189. SHIFT CHANGE (Moving Images 2012) in Now: Fixing the Future (PBS broadcast
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V. THE MIETHAUSER SYNDIKAT MODEL

A. History and Development
Germany's post-war history has been plagued by housing
shortages of varying urgency. 190 Starting in the 1960s, residential
buildings in large numbers were occupied by squatters, both to secure
living space and to protest the inflation of living costs through real
estate speculation. 191 The occupation of many of these buildings
continues today, some 'legitimized' by purchase or alternative means, 192
while others are still the focus of intense struggles. 193 Many of the
individual housing projects now organized in the Mietshauser Syndikat
were former "squat houses" that had persisted for years or even decades
in organizational isolation. 194

Nov. 17, 2010).
190. See FED. RESEARCH DIVIS., GERMANY: A COUNTRY STUDY (Eric Solsten ed., 1996)
available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.390 l 5039072544;view= 1up;seq= 1
(last visited Oct. 27, 2014) ("Housing" chapter).
191. See generally Klaus Pokatzky, "Noch vie/ mehr Polizei!", DIE ZEIT (Oct. 18,
1985), archived version available at http://www.zeit.de/l 985/43/noch-viel-mehrpolizei/seite-l (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (describing the tensions in the city ofFreiburg in
connection with several housing projects, which served as a nexus for the student left and
the punk scene). The fall of the Berlin Wall led to the reunification of the city and spread
the squatters' movement from west to east, where East Berliners sought both political
change and resisted the incursion of West German investors. See Geschichte - Die
Hausbesetzerlnnenbewegung in Ost-Berlin, Teil
l, SQUATTER, available at
http://www.squatter.w3brigade.de/content/geschichte/die-hausbesetzerbewegung-ost-berlinteill (last visited on Nov. 16, 2014).
192. One example is the "Pferdestall" in Frankfurt am Main, now a community center.
See AKTIONSGEMEINSCHAFT WESTEND E.V., available at http://www.aktionsgemeinschaftwestend.de/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
193. One such 'hot-spot' is the Rote Flora house in Hamburg, whose legal owner
threatened to finally clear the house of squatters after decades of occupation. See Jorg
Ziercke, BKA-Chefwarnt vor Gewalteskalationen wie in Hamburg, DIE ZEIT (Jan. 23, 2014,
18: 12), available at http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2014-01/hamburg-krawalle-bkachef-wamung-gewaltspirale (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). This in tum led to considerable
social unrest in late 2013 and early 2014, including street battles between Hamburg police
and demonstrators.
See Kersten Augustin, Mit dem Fingerspitzengefiihl eines
Polizeiknuppels,
DIE
ZEIT
(Jan.
14,
2014,
15:43),
available
at
http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2014-01 I gefahrengebiet-hamburg-kommentar
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (opinion piece condemning the mayor of Hamburg's policing
policies as having "the tact of a billy club"). At the time of writing the Rote Flora's fate
remained uncertain. See Christoph Twickel & Marc Widmann, "Wir machen das ": Die
Rote Flora gehohrt jetzt der Lawaetz-Stiftung; Was hat sie damit vor?, DIE ZEIT (November
6, 2014, 12:00) available at http://www.zeit.de/2014/46/rote-flora-lawaetz-stiftung (last
visited Dec. 17, 2014) (describing the purchase of the property by a third party that hopes to
mediate between the activists and the city).
Linie
206,
MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT,
available
at
194. See
http://www.syndikat.org/de/projekte/linie206/ (last visited Dec. 17 2014) (description of a
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The Mietshauser Syndikat was founded in Freiburg in 1992. 195
The Syndikat was the product of efforts by members of the "Grether"
housing project, a former metal foundry that was converted into housing
units in 1988 and became the Syndikat's first member project. 196 The
aim of the founders, as stated by one member, was to capitalize on the
success of the Grether Project to finance similar efforts and use the
members' collective experience to aid such projects. 197 The Syndikat's
goal is to help groups obtain affordable housing outside the
conventional tenancy relationship. 198 The Syndikat's guiding principles
are self-organization, solidarity, and the "neutralization of property," i.e.
freeing residential property from speculative influence. 199
Starting in the mid-1990s, the Mietshauser Syndikat aided in the
foundation of several housing projects, which continues at the steady
pace of about one to three new projects a year. 200 At present there are
eighty-four projects and twenty-eight initiatives in development. 201
While some of the member projects pre-date the Syndikat, the vast
majority of the projects were founded with the Syndikat' s assistance. 202
Out of all the initiatives organized in cooperation with the Syndikat only
a handful have failed, twice due to being outbid by another prospective
purchaser of a building and once because the owner of a building
refused to sell to the Syndikat. 203 Three other initiatives have
voluntarily dissolved without ever attempting to purchase a building. 204
Of the completed projects only one has ever experienced insolvency. 205
Berlin project originally occupied by squatters in 1990).
195. MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT, Presentation in Barcelona, Spain: Das MietshiiuserSyndikat - The Tenement Syndicate at Slide 7 (July 7, 2013) [hereinafter Presentation]
(unpublished PowerPoint, on file with author) (power point presentation delivered by
members of the Syndikat in July of 2013 to potential member-investors in a project in
Barcelona, Spain).
196. ARD Ratgeber Bauen + Wohnen (ARD television broadcast May 10, 2009).
197. Id. (the Grether Project members found it important to "provid[e] know-how to
other projects so that they wouldn't have to re-invent the wheel").
198. ALTOTTINGER MIETER KONVENT E.V., Flyer: Wohnen geht auch anders! (2009)
(unpublished tlyer)(on file with author) [hereinafter AMK Flyer] ("We would like to
establish self-determined and self-organized free spaces for all residents and thereby
dissolve traditional power relations between renters and lessors.").
199. Presentation, supra note 195, slides 12-13.
200. Presentation, supra note 195, slide 7.
201. Standortkarte, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, supra note 7 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014)
(increase of three new projects over the prior year).
202. See Linie 206, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, supra note 194.
203. See
Chronik,
MIETSHAUSER
SYNDIKAT,
available
at
www.syndikat.org/de/syndikat/chronik/ (last visited on Nov. 16, 2014).
204. See id.
205. See id. (the project in question was the "Eilhardshof' Project in Neustadt-an-der-
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There are now nearly 2,000 residents living within almost 60,000 square
meters of living space in Syndikat projects. 206 Since its inception the
Syndikat has invested over €60,000,000 in housing projects. 207
1. Organization and Structure

The Mietshauser Syndikat represents a formal, hierarchical
constellation of several entities. 208 At the apex stands the non-profit
Mietshauser
Syndikat
Association
(hereinafter
"Syndikat
Association"), 209 which is the sole proprietor of the Mietshauser
Syndikat LLC (hereinafter "Syndikat LLC"), 210 the entity that manages
the finances related to the various projects and assists in their formation
and administration. 211 The Syndikat LLC is in tum a forty-nine percent
stakeholder in each individual project's LLC, with the local non-profit
"Residents' Association" 212 controlling the remainder. 213 However, the
Residents' Associations also become members of the Syndikat
Association, resulting in a constitutive feedback loop unique among the
entities discussed here. 214 Beyond guaranteeing the residents a seat at
the table of their local LLC they are offered control over the entire
Syndikat organization through their Association, ensuring that no
decisions are made over their heads. 215
Also notable is that the Syndikat' s individual project entities are
not cooperatives but LLCs. 216 The founders of the Mietshauser
Syndikat initially intended to use cooperatives. 217 They discovered,
WeinstraBe).
206. Linie 206, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, supra note 194.
207. Presentation, supra note 195, slide 9.
208. An excellent organizational chart is available on the Mietshauser Syndikat
website.
See The Joint Venture, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, available at
http://www.syndikat.org/en/syndikat_en/joint_venture/ (last visited on Dec. 17, 2014).
209. Id. (German: "Mietshauser Syndikat e.V.").
210. Id. (German: "Mietshauser Syndikat GmbH").
211. Id.; see also AMK Flyer, supra note 198 (explaining the role of the Syndikat in
the AMK project).
212. The Joint Venture, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, supra note 208 (German:
"Hausverein").
213. Presentation, supra note 195, slides 14-15; AMK Flyer, supra note 198
(explaining that in any project the Syndikat and Residents' Association are the sole owners
of the LLC that formally owns a given property and that each has a single, equal vote).
214. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28-29 (membership qualifications of the
Syndikat Association); see id. at 30 (copy of the Syndikat Gmbh's charter, listing the
Syndikat Association as the sole interest holder); see Presentation, supra note 195, slide 1415.
215. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 29.
216. See id. at 29.
217. See Die Verbundbausteine - Keine Genossenschaft, MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT,
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however, that there would be almost no effective way to bind a series of
individual housing cooperatives together. 218 At the same time, a single
large-scale cooperative encompassing all the housing projects would be
unwieldy and severely limit the autonomy of the individual projects. 219
This prompted the use of LLCs, which provided control to prevent sale
of the properties while also being flexible enough to permit democratic
management. 220

2. On the Ground: The Project LLCs and Residents' Associations
The first step for those seeking to found a new housing project or
associate an existing one with the Syndikat is to form a non-profit
association. 221 Once the formalities for the association are complete, 222
the new Residents' Association may apply to the Syndikat Association
for membership and to the Syndikat LLC for practical assistance. 223
Once approved by the Members' Assembly 224 of the Syndikat
Association, the Residents' Association is granted membership and the
process of founding the housing project LLC begins. 225 The Syndikat
LLC acquires a forty-nine percent interest and while the Residents'
Association is technically the majority interest-holder, the operating
agreement of each LLC provides that the Syndikat LLC enjoys absolute
voting parity with the Residents' Association on questions of alienation
of the property or its privatization. 226 In this way the Syndikat may
available at www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. Civil Code§§ 21-22 (Ger.).
222. For registered associations this requires the presentation of the charter and some
other documentation to a local court agency (German: Amtsgericht). Id.
223. See MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, available at www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16,
2014); see also HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28-29, 32-34 (explaining the conditions and
advantages of membership in the Syndikat Association, as well as offering an example of a
cost-sharing agreement between the Syndikat LLC and one of the House Project LLCs).
The Members' Assembly of the Syndikat Association decides on the admission of all
members. HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 29.
224. HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 10, 29 (German: "Mitgliedversammlung").
225. Id.
226. Presentation, supra note 195, slides 14-15; AMK Flyer, supra note 198;
HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28. Other requirements concern non-discrimination policies
in the acceptance of new resident members and the adoption of transparent accounting
practices and democratic governance. Lending agreements include separate, further controls
related to the repayment of loans but terminate once these debts are satisfied. See
HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28, 32-34. Although further requirements are not formally
included in the individual project agreements, the Members' Assembly of the Syndikat
Association is able to engage in a process of selection: while it affirms the need for diversity
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ensure that the Residents' Association does not subvert the original
Beyond these fundamental concerns,
purpose of the project. 227
however, the Syndikat LLC has no role in an individual housing
project's daily affairs. 228 As a result, all decisions concerning house
rules, maintenance, renovations or any other house-specific activities
are left entirely to the discretion of the residents themselves. 229
After the formation of the project LLC, that entity and the Syndikat
LLC sign a "Cost-Sharing Agreement" 230 , which is virtually identical
for all projects and obligates the project LLC to pay a progressively
increasing "Solidarity Transfer" 231 to the Syndikat LLC. 232 This
payment begins at ten Eurocents per square meter of living space per
month. 233 It rises by 5% per year from the previous year, a pace
calculated to ensure continued funding for the Syndikat LLC's activities
but low enough to give individual projects the time needed to pay down
debts incurred at foundation, usually scheduled for a forty year
period. 234 However, an absolute maximum for the Solidarity Transfer is
set at 80% of the local average rent, ensuring both that established
housing projects are not unduly burdened to the benefit of newer
projects and that the projects can all continue to offer affordable
in living arrangements, "this does not mean that there are no limits." Das Syndikat in
Betrieb, MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT, available at www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16
2014). The Members' Assembly decides on the acceptance of each individual project,
whereby some may be "totally rejected," such as commercial projects, "anti-emancipatory
projects of a cult or, even more extreme, that of a Neonazi group." Id.
227. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28, 32-34.
Verbundbausteine, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, available at
228. See Die
www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); AMK Flyer, supra note 198 ("In all other
affairs the Residents' Association generally has the sole say: Who moves in? How will we
renovate? How high will the rent be? The decisions and their execution belong solely to
those who live in the house.").
229. The 51 % share of the local association in the project LLC provides sufficient
interest to allow for local control. This simplifies the operating agreement, which provides
for special voting rules on the questions described above but by default leaves all other
decisions in the hands of the local association. Die Verbundbausteine, MIETSHAUSERSYNDIKAT, available at www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); Flyer, supra note
198.
230. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 34-35 (German: "Vereinbarung zur
Kostenbeteiligung").
231. Id. (German: "Solidartransfer").
232. See id. (copying an actual Cost-Sharing Agreement between the Syndikat LLC
and the Templerhaus LLC, a project in Weinheim, Germany).
233. See id.
234. See id.; see Presentation, supra note 195, slide 20 (graphically representing a
typical payment scheme, where the contributions to the "Solidarity Fund" increases as the
payments for financing debt decreases); see Solidarfonds, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT,
available at www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16 2014).
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housing. 235 As consideration for this payment, the Syndikat LLC aids
the local project in its development, including acquisition of financing,
community fund-raising, advertising and questions of tax and corporate
law. 236
3. The Big Picture: The Mietshiiuser Syndikat e. V. & Mietshiiuser
Syndikat Gmbh
The Syndikat Association is governed by the Members'
Assembly. 237 The Members' Assembly has two main functions: first, to
appoint and oversee the officers of the Syndikat LLC; second, to decide
which projects to take on and accept as members of the Syndikat
Association. 238 Each member has an equal vote and while members are
encouraged to invest beyond the minimum amount, additional
investment does not increase voting power. 239
The Syndikat LLC's primary function is to advise new and
continuing projects on subjects as varied as finance management,
repayment of debts, tax law and possible strategies for improving their
buildings. 240 The LLC also administers the "Solidarity Fund," out of
which the individual project LLCs are capitalized. 241 The Syndikat
Association's Board of Directors, elected by the Members' Assembly,
oversees the Syndikat LLC's day-to-day activities. 242
It is worth noting that there are no paid positions in the Syndikat
LLC and most consulting is conducted on a pro bono basis by members
of existing projects with specialized knowledge or experience. 243
235. The relevant statistics, "Mietspiegel" in German, are produced by local municipal
and state governments and contain comprehensive rent rate information. See Mietspiegel,
SENATSVERWALTUNG
FOR
STADTENTWICKLUNG
UND
UMWELT,
available at
http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/wohnen/mietspiegel/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
236. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 34-35.
237. See id. at 29-30 (the Members' Assembly operating on the basis of a democratic
consensus-building).
238. See id. at 28-30; Skype Interview with Marcel Seehuber, Member, AMK e.V. ,
Mietshauser-Syndikat (Nov. 2, 2013) (membership is also open to individuals and other
organizations, which helps in engaging local residents or community groups in the
development process; current members must vote to confer membership, which is a
prerequisite for the Syndikat's assistance); see also HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28-29.
239. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28-29; Interview with Marcel Seehuber, supra
note 238.
240. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 32-33.
241. See id. (German: "Solidarfonds").
242. See Das Syndikat in Betrieb, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, available at
http://www.syndikat.org/en/syndikat_en/operation/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (outlining
the role of the LLC in relation to the Syndikat Association).
243. See id. ("[T]he counseling and supervision of a house initiative be provided free of
charge by committed volunteers from existing projects.").
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Regular workshops and information exchanges take place at the same
time as the meetings of the Members' Assembly, furthering this 'do-ityourself ethos. 244
B. Applicability and Advantages of the Mietshauser Syndikat Model

The Mietshauser-Syndikat's model offers considerable advantages
in the development of workers' cooperatives outside of Germany. The
Syndikat model is not dependent upon any peculiarities of German law,
but is almost fully transferable to any jurisdiction that provides for
LLC-type entities.245 Although differences exist between the operations
of housing cooperatives and workers' cooperatives, these do not
undermine the inherent strength and resilience of the Syndikat model,
which can be adapted to the particular needs of these enterprises.
Finally, this organizational format is the best for fostering workplace
democracy and democratic economic development, an oft-touted ideal
of the cooperative movement at large and rhetorically prominent in the
self-representations of the Mondragon and Evergreen cooperatives. 246
The following discussion sketches how a Syndikat-type network of
workers' cooperatives could be formed and organized in civil law
(Spain) and common law (the United States) jurisdictions to promote
effective and democratic economic development.
1. Applicability to Workers' Cooperatives

The Mietshauser-Syndikat's purpose is to expand affordable,
quality housing and neither it nor its member organizations engage in
manufacturing or provide services. 247 Nevertheless, with slight
modification this model would lend itself well to the development of
244. See id. (the Members' Assembly "[i]s always scheduled on a weekend, leaving
room for the exchange of information, counseling, workshops, mutual help and the
opportunity to meet people from other projects.").
245. See generally Lenhardt, supra note 15, at 551-52; see Larry E. Ribstein, A
Critique of the Uniform Limited Liability Act, 25 STETSON L. REV. 311, 314-15 (1995)
(noting the near universality of the LLC in the U.S. as of the mid-l 990s ); see THE LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY CENTER, available at http://www.limitedliabilitycompanycenter.com/
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (providing a brief history of the development of LLCs in all 50
states).
246. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 14-16, 30, 33 (relating Mondragon
founder Arizmendiarrieta' s commitment to democracy and insistence on worker
empowerment); see EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES, Evergreen Businesses, available at
http://evergreencooperatives.com/businesses/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) (including an
explicit endorsement of increased democracy in the workplace).
24 7. In fact, beyond the initial capitalization of the individual project LLCs, the
Mietshauser-Syndikat does not provide any financing at all, even for housing projects. See
HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28.
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both individual worker-managed enterprises and a network of such
entities.
The primary difference between the Mietshauser Syndikat and a
hypothetical "Worker Cooperative Network" (termed "Co-op Network"
for convenience) would be one of focus: instead of acquiring capital for
the purchase of real estate, the network would raise funds to found
enterprises and instead of examining the feasibility of purchasing or
converting a building, the network would assess the prospects and
sustainability of a proposed enterprise. 248 A parallel entity to the
Syndikat LLC would aid in the organization and financing of worker
cooperatives. 249 The individual enterprises would be members in the
Co-op Network's executive non-profit entity, where a Members'
Assembly would elect the non-profit's board, appoint the Co-op
Network LLC directors and oversee its activities. 250 The individual
enterprises would still enjoy considerable autonomy in day-to-day
operations, but the Co-op Network's LLC would possess an interest
sufficient to prevent sale or conversion of the enterprise into a
"conventional" business. 251
2. Transferring the Mietshiiuser Syndikat Model to Other Jurisdictions
To ease administration by the Members' Assembly, an umbrella
non-profit entity with full control of the Co-op Network's LLC is
essential. 252 The Co-op Network LLC would then share ownership of
the individual enterprises with their worker-owners. 253 In many
jurisdictions, the for-profit nature of the individual enterprises may

248. The Mietshauser Syndikat engages in such vetting and planning in all its housing
projects, often working with residents through a long process of project development. See
Das Syndikat in Betrieb, supra note 242.
249. In this respect, certain comparisons could be drawn between the roles of
Mondragon's Caja Laboral and the Syndikat LLC. See AxwoRTHY, supra note 66, at 5;
WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 69; Das Syndikat in Betrieb, supra note 242.
250. See Das Syndikat in Betrieb, Organigramm, MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT, available
at http://www.syndikat.org/en/syndikat_en/operation/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (the
Organigramm page flow chart is probably the clearest depiction of the constitutive nature of
the Syndikat).
251. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28 (among the conditions set for the Syndikat's
assistance is "the exclusion of any private property interest in the building"). It should be
noted that while the Syndikat possesses a little less than a half-interest in each project LLC,
the principle of voting parity on issues of sale or privatization rests in the LLC's formation
agreement itself, allowing the Syndikat greater control than its proportional interest would
otherwise allow.
See Die Finanzierung, MtETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT, available at
http://www.syndikat.org/en/syndikat_en/funding/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
252. See Das Syndikat in Betrieb, supra note 242.
253. See id.
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preclude formation of a non-profit entity that would represent the
worker-owners in both the individual LLC and the Members'
Assembly. 254 This is not an insurmountable hurdle, however: on the
ground level, voting parity with the Co-op Network LLC can be
achieved through the enterprise LLC 's operating agreement255 and the
executive non-profit's by-laws can facilitate representation by the
worker-owners. 256
In the U.S., there are a few types of entities that would be
compatible with the democratic decision-making process of the
Mietshauser-Syndikat. 257 One option would be the Benefit Corporation,
which would permit the Co-op Network to pursue socially-driven
economic development while founding essentially for-profit
enterprises. 258 The Members' Assembly would consist of shareholders
in the Benefit Corporation, whose articles of incorporation would
govern both membership and the decision-making process, preserving
the constitutive qualities of the Syndikat Association. 259 However, a
central component of the Syndikat model is absolute voting parity
within the Members' Assembly, which may be difficult to maintain in
an entity where votes are formally tied to shares. 260 This would require
254. See id.; Non-Profit Entities Law, B.O.E. n. 307 art. 3(6) (Spain), available at
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/12/24/pdfs/A45229-45243.pdf (last visited Nov. 16,
2014).
255. See generally UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT§§ 201, 405, 407 (1994) (amended 2006),
available
at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/
docs/limited%20liability°/o20company/ullca_final_06rev.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
256. 26 U.S.C § 503 (2014).
257. As detailed above, the highest organ in the Mietshauser Syndikat is a registered
association, a non-profit organization. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 29 (reproduction
of the Syndikat Association's articles of incorporation).
258. See Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A

Primer on Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for
the Benefit Corporation, 4 WM . & MARY Bus. L. REV. 639, 697-701 (2013) (offering a good
overview of the characteristics of the Benefit Corporation as compared to other American
and European social enterprise entities) [hereinafter "Social Enterprise Revolution"]; cf
Anne E. Conaway, What we can Learn from Other Statutory Schemes: Lessons to be

Learned: How the Policy of Freedom to Contract in Delaware's Alternative Entity Law
Might Inform Delaware's General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 792-93
(2012) (detailing the characteristics of the "B Corporation," which is privately certified and
regulated by the non-profit B Labs) [hereinafter "Conaway, Alternative Entity Law"]; see
also, Ann E. Conaway, The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for
Socially-Driven Purposes, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 772, 773, 779 (2012) (suggesting
utilizing hybrid-purpose LLCs for the pursuit of both profit and social benefit in Great
Britain).
259. See Social Enterprise Revolution, supra note 258, at 697-98.
260. Each member, whether a Syndikat-sponsored project, a community organization
or a natural person, receives only one vote, with no possibility for the acquisition of more.
See Interview with Marcel Seehuber, supra note 238; HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 14;
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some mechanism by which large numbers of shares are held in reserve
for distribution to new members or which proportionally reduces
existing member shares with each addition. 261
Also, Benefit
Corporations are very new entities whose contours and duties have not
yet been tested by courts or extensive real-world practice: to date, only
thirteen U.S. states have passed statutes permitting Benefit
Corporations. 262
A 'tried-and-true' entity may be preferable to experimenting with a
new one and forming a 501(c) non-profit presents itself as the safer
option. 263 One potential hurdle would be that the Co-op Network nonprofit would, through its LLC, have an interest in profit-generating
enterprises. 264 However, I.R.C. § 50l(c) includes a wide array of
organizations and sets as its primary requirement that any entity
organized under its aegis neither seek private profit nor distribute any to
private shareholders. 265 A 501(c)(6) "business league" formed in the
U.S. along the lines of the Mietshauser Syndikat would almost certainly
meet these criteria. 266 Either a Benefit Corporation or a 501(c)(6),
properly organized or approved by the IRS, 267 would avoid potential
regulatory issues and permit democratic governance. 268
In Spain, by contrast, the Syndikat Association could be
reproduced on an almost one-to-one basis. 269 Spanish non-profit
Social Enterprise Revolution, supra note 258, at 696-97 (describing the structure and legal
requirements for Benefit Corporations).
261. See Social Enterprise Revolution, supra note 258, at 696-97.
262. See id. at 697.
263. See 26 U.S.C. § 50l(c) (2010).
264. By comparison, all the projects of the Mietshauser Syndikat seek no profit but
instead benefits for their resident members. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28.
265. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (2010) (permitting the organization of tax-exempt
"[b ]usiness leagues, chambers of commerce ... [and] boards of trade ... not organized for
profit and no part of the net earnings of which insures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual.").
266. The members of the Mietshauser Syndikat e.V. receive no profits or dividends
whatsoever and because the Syndikat does not finance projects but instead merely
capitalizes the initial project LLCs, there is also no possibility of indirectly profiting through
decisions of the Members' Assembly. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28.
267. A 50l(c) organization must file IRS Form 1023 to acquire recognition as a taxexempt entity.
See Form 1023, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fl 023. pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014 ).
268. See 26 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2011) (identifying "prohibited transactions" that would
serve as grounds for denial of exemption); Conaway, supra note 258, at 792-93 (describing
the "triple bottom-line" purpose ofB Corporations).
269. See Anthony C. Infanti, Spontaneous Tax Coordination: On Adopting a
Comparative Approach to Reforming the US. International Tax Regime, 35 V AND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1105, 1210-11 (2002) (summarizing the requirements for non-profit
associations in Spain); Non-Profit Entities Law, Exposition of Motives II (B.O.E. 2002, 49)
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associations are permitted to own interests in other entities, so long as
they do not pass on any proceeds to private persons. 270 Spanish law
would also permit the democratic organization of an association and
membership criteria like those of the Mietshauser Syndikat. 271 The
second-degree cooperative groups provided for under Spanish law could
in principle unify the functions of the Syndikat Association and LLC. 272
However, the Cooperative Law mandates a structure that lacks both the
same democratic character that the Syndikat model offers and adequate
safeguards against alienation. 273 Cooperative groups are defined as
having a "head entity that exercises authority or communicates
instructions that are binding on the grouped cooperatives," 274 while
having only limited means to prevent members from leaving the
organization. 275 As such, to acquire the advantages of the Mietshauser
Syndikat model in civil law jurisdictions it would be best to parallel the
Syndikat structure as closely as possible rather than attempt to adapt
local cooperative forms.
As noted above, one of the unique aspects of the Mietshauser
Syndikat is its status as a network organized in the "cooperative spirit"
which has declined to use the cooperative form in favor of
democratically-structured LLCs. 276 In jurisdictions where business
entities may become members of cooperatives and can acquire an
interest sufficient to prevent the sale or conversion of the enterprise, one
could use the cooperative form without giving up any of the advantages

(Spain), available at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/l 2/24/pdfs/A45229-45243 .pdf (last
visited Nov. 16, 2014) (permitting non-profit entities to "freely acquire interests in
commercial enterprises" and including non-profits that "promote the social economy,"
respectively); Civil Code§ 21-22 (Ger.).
270. Non-Profit Entities Law art. 3(6) (B.O.E. 2002, 49) (Spain) available at
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/12/24/pdfs/A45229-45243.pdf(last visited Nov. 16, 2014)
(prohibiting even the reversion of assets to a founder or their heirs in the event of the nonprofit's dissolution).
271. Organizational Law art. 2(5) (B.O.E. 2002, 1) (Spain), available at
https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/03/26/pdfs/Al 1981-11991.pdf (last visited Nov. 16,
2014) ("The internal organization of associations ... shall be democratic.").
272. Cooperative Law arts. 77-78 (Spain).
273. Id.
274. Id. art. 78(1 ).
275. Id. arts. 17, 77(6) (providing that member cooperatives in a second-degree
cooperative enjoy all the same rights as members of a first-degree cooperative, which under
Article 17 includes the right to leave the cooperative at any time, limited only by the
cooperative's right to demand notice ofup to one year).
276. See Verbundbausteine - Keine Genossenschafi, MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT,
available at http://www.syndikat.org/en/syndikat_en/building_blocks/ (last visited Nov. 16,
2014).
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of the Syndikat model. 277 However, where such an arrangement is not
legally possible 278 or carries significant regulatory burdens, 279 aligning
individual enterprises in LLCs using the Mietshauser Syndikat model
would open the way to the development of democratic enterprises of
scale. 280
In the U.S., some states limit membership and ownership interest
in a cooperative to persons employed by the cooperative, precluding any
permanent ownership interest by the Co-op Network. 281 Because such
an ownership interest is the simplest and most effective way for our
hypothetical Co-op Network to ensure that a democratic enterprise is
not later sold or converted into a standard business, the use of LLCs
would be required. 282 Fortunately, founders of LLCs enjoy great
latitude in crafting operating agreements, such that provisions for
democratic governance and safeguards against sale or conversion may
be inserted easily. 283
In Spain, by contrast, mixed membership cooperatives are possible,
meaning that a Co-op Network could be a member in a cooperative
alongside natural persons. 284 However, no cooperative member is
permitted to control more than 30% of the votes. 285 As such, a
Syndikat-style Co-op Network LLC would lack sufficient voting power
to prevent the sale or conversion of individual cooperatives. 286 Spanish

277. The "second-degree cooperative" in Spain leaves open such a possibility, albeit
with the issues described in this section. Cooperative Law arts. 77-78 (Spain).
278. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 157A, § 6 (West 2014) ("No person may be
accepted as a member unless employed by the employee cooperative." "An employee
cooperative shall issue a class of voting stock [and] [e]ach member shall own only one such
membership share, and only members may own such shares.").
279. See Verbundbausteine - Keine Genossenschaft, MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT,
available at http://www.syndikat.org/en/syndikat_en/building_blocks/ (last visited Nov. 16,
2014) (another reason the Syndikat rejected the cooperative as an entity was because
operations were made more difficult by the "continuous reporting requirements" of the
Cooperative Auditing Association).
Chronik,
MIETSHAUSER
SYNDIKAT,
available
at
280. See
http://www.syndikat.org/de/syndikat/chronik/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (a timeline
detailing the rapid growth of the Syndikat in the last two decades).
281. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 157A, § 6 (West 2014).
282. Id.
283. UNIFORM LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 110 (1994) (1994)(amended 2006), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability<>lo20company/ullca_final_ 06re
v.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
284. Cooperative Law art. 12 (Spain).
285. Id. art. 26.
286. Id. art. 64(2) (under the law a two-thirds majority is prescribed for transforming a
cooperative enterprise or merging it with another cooperative enterprise and this cannot be
changed in the by-laws).
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LLCs, like U.S. LLCs, offer great latitude in determining the decisionmaking process. 287 As such, the LLC recommends itself as a format
flexible enough to allow for hard-wiring democratic governance into an
enterprise while still permitting the necessary degree of control on the
part of the Co-op Network as parent LLC. 288

3. Advantages over the Mondragon and Evergreen Models
The advantages of the Miethauser Syndikat over the Mondragon
Corporation and the Evergreen Cooperative Corporation are two-fold.
First, the Syndikat model represents a more thoroughly democratic
approach to enterprise development and management than either
Mondragon or the ECC. Second, the Syndikat's development process is
highly sustainable, in part due to the fact that its democratic structure is
eminently suited to stable, organic growth.
While the Mondragon Corporation is regularly cited as the greatest
success story in the history of cooperatives, it is not without flaws. 289
The essentially top-down management structure, with the Caja Laboral
as the unofficial apex entity, casts serious doubt on the paeans praising
Mondragon as a ready-made template for economic democracy. 290 As
members of the Mondragon Caja themselves have often admitted,
Mondragon is an otherwise conventional business that happens to
consist of cooperatives. 291 Mondragon's recent history of investing in
businesses that do not offer membership to employees also feeds the
suspicion that, in order to generate profits, Mondragon is ready, willing
and able to engage in the same practices that its proponents find so
objectionable about "conventional" businesses. 292
The Evergreen Cooperative Corporation, explicitly modeled on the
Mondragon Corporation, has done nothing to address these issues. 293
Indeed, its management structure is even more technocratic than that of
Mondragon and it remains uncertain at this early stage what degree of
287. Id. art. 125.
288. Id.
289. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 11.
290. See id. at 7; see generally WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 296-97.
291. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 7.
292. See FAQs, MONDRAGON CORPORATION, available at http://www.mondragoncorporation.com/eng/co-operative-experience/faqs/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (noting at
least one program under which a significant number of non-members are to be
enfranchised); Contradictions in Paradise, WORKERS' PARADISE (Jan. 31, 2011, 7:00 AM),
available at http://www.cooperativeconsult.com/blog/?p=490 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014)
(discussing a strike over low wages and poor working conditions by workers at a
Mondragon-owned factory in Poland).
293. See Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 3, 5.
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autonomy the individual cooperatives will enjoy and how constitutive
the ECC's executive organ will become. 294 As the project is still in its
infancy, one could excuse the current technocratic methods as necessary
expediencies on the path to a more democratic future. 295 If it persists in
the same vein as present, however, the sponsoring "anchor enterprises"
will dominate the ECC at the highest level, with cooperative members
wielding little control over its future. 296
The Mietshauser Syndikat model addresses such eventualities
through an absolute institutional commitment to democratic decisionmaking and mandatory admission of member projects in the governing
Members' Assembly. 297 Although allowed significant autonomy, the
individual projects would have to extend membership to all
constituents, who would have representation in the Members'
Assembly. 298 The operating agreements of the project LLCs would
enable the Co-op Network LLC to check any effort to sell or convert a
project. 299 Similarly, it is unlikely that a proposal to invest in
'conventional' enterprises, i.e. ones that would not become members,
would find sufficient support in the Members' Assembly. 300 Even if it
did, the by-laws of the Co-op Network non-profit can be crafted to
preclude such an outcome.301
One could make the argument that the undemocratic aspects of
both Mondragon and the ECC merely reflect the economic necessity of
speedy, centralized decision-making without which these enterprises
would fail. 302 This argument bears a striking resemblance to a common
argument against cooperatives in general: too much democracy
paralyzes decision-making and hobbles a business. 303 This latter
position has been sufficiently disproved by the success of Mondragon
cooperatives, which operate on a largely democratic basis in their dayto-day operations. 304 In fact, enhancing democratic structures can
294. See id. at 14.
295. See generally id.
296. See id. at 5, 14.
297. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 29 (describing membership policies and
identifying the Members' Association as the executive body).
298. See id. at 28.
299. See id. at 14 (§ 5 of the sample LLC operating agreement).
300. See id. at 28.
301. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 29 (If the "purpose of the association is
fundamentally altered, the assets [thereof] must be used for the original purpose,"
administered by a trustee).
302. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 6-7.
303. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 3.
304. See id. at 3-4.
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actually stimulate and ensure sustainable growth, improving the stability
of a Co-op Network as a whole.
The Mondragon Corporation has experienced severe contractions
in the course of its history, when cooperatives were forced to merge or
failed entirely. 305 The Caja Laboral's policy of developing cooperatives
with an eye toward existing enterprises' supply and service needs has
had positive synergistic effects but left Mondragon as a whole
susceptible to chain reactions of bankruptcies. 306 The concentration of
power in the hands of the Caja Laboral also means that business
development draws not on the wide base of experience and knowledge
of its members, but instead solely on that of a small number of
conventionally-trained technocrats. 307
Likewise, the central ECC non-profit is in full control of all
business development. 308 While this institution's members certainly
possess expertise that is essential to developing new cooperatives, this
model could also foster a degree of group-think. 309 One way to avoid
this outcome is to increase the knowledge and experience base of the
decision makers, which can be achieved by allowing for the
participation of all cooperative members.
The Members' Assembly of the Mietshauser Syndikat makes all
decisions concerning the acceptance of new projects, although the
implementation of that decision is delegated to the Syndikat LLC. Far
from hampering growth, the Mietshauser Syndikat continues to accept
new projects on a yearly basis. More importantly, all but one of the
projects developed in cooperation with the Syndikat have been
successful, a truly remarkable record of sustainability and stability.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is not to deny the success of the
Mondragon Corporation or to deride the efforts of the Evergreen
Cooperative Corporation, as each represent an inspiring success story
and a welcome initiative in the history of cooperative economic
development. Rather, the concerns and issues surrounding those two

305. See id. at 177-78, 188-89.
306. See id. at 47, 177-78.
307. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 6-7.
308. Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 14 (the Evergreen Cooperative
Development Fund and Business Services LLC are also involved but are entirely controlled
by the ECC non-profit).
309. See id.
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enterprises are pointed out to illustrate that the goal of promoting
democratic economic development may be hampered and not helped by
The Mietshauser Syndikat
the use of non-democratic methods.
demonstrates that it is possible to develop democratic enterprises,
organize them in a network and ensure sustained growth of both
enterprise and network utilizing exclusively democratic structures,
without resort to the top-down organizational schemes of conventional
businesses. In pursuing a more prosperous, equitable and democratic
economy, the means are inseparable from the ends and the Mietshauser
Syndikat represents a model in both methods and results.
Moreover, the Mietshauser Syndikat's structure, a constellation of
LLCs under the umbrella of a non-profit governing entity, can be
replicated in both civil and common-law jurisdictions. As such it
should be possible to re-purpose the Mietshauser Syndikat's model for
worker-managed enterprises and to repeat its success across the globe.
Indeed, the Mietshauser Syndikat itself is beginning to venture outside
the borders of Germany and develop projects in other European
countries. 310 As those efforts will surely show, the day of international
networks of democratic enterprises is approaching and with it a more
prosperous future.

310. Interview with Marcel Seehuber, supra note 238; Presentation, supra note 195,
Slide 17.
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